Cedar Rapids releases independent after-action review of derecho response

CEDAR RAPIDS — When the derecho’s winds pummeled Cedar Rapids last summer as the COVID-19 pandemic posed a public health threat, the city faced a reality that typically would seem “unrealistic” with widespread power and cell service outages and fallen trees blocking nearly every street, according to a report unveiled Friday.

Among an independent firm’s recommendations in the city of Cedar Rapids’ after-action review of the 2020 derecho, released just over a year after the storm, were that the city increase awareness of the process to request resources, enhance backup methods of communication and institutionalize ways of coordinating services like food and shelter with external agencies.

The city contracted with Atchison Consulting Service for $25,000 to conduct the 22-page review of its response to the natural disaster — the costliest thunderstorm in U.S. history, which resulted in an estimated $11 billion in damage across the Midwest.

Cathleen Atchison, the consultant, said over 80 people from all city departments involved in the response, City Council members, volunteer organizations and other agencies were interviewed as part of the review.

It is the second such review to be released this week, in addition to Linn County’s after-action review. The Iowa Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management’s report still is in the works.

Cedar Rapids Derecho 2020 After Action Review by Gazette Online on Scribd

Communication

Widespread power and cell service outages after the derecho severely disrupted communications and revealed a need for the city to prepare other methods — including paper templates and scripted messages, to rely on in the aftermath of a disaster, the firm recommended.

One instance of when the communication challenges compounded stress for staff and the public, according to the consultant, was the city’s decision to delay news conferences while the power remained out, which prevented information from being shared with the public in video form.

“Inadvertently this decision led to a negative tone from some media outlets which compounded the already stressful environment,” the report stated.

The report did note that city staff creativity and long-standing partnerships and relationships helped provide solutions to keep communication flowing in some form, such as using donated paper to create print flyers.

The firm recommended the city identify processes to better communicate with the public, particularly displaced homeowners and vulnerable populations such as the immigrant and refugee community.

Cedar Rapids Derecho 2020 Improvement Planning Matrix by Gazette Online on Scribd

Mass care services

Challenges while facing those communications barriers included “delayed knowledge of external partners that weren’t available to support response efforts that have been depended upon in past disasters,” the report stated, including mass care services needed to provide shelter and food.

But city staff “became proactive and began the coordination process” when the Linn County Emergency Management Agency was initially unable to coordinate these services, the firm found.

The Linn County report similarly identified a shortage of emergency shelters after the storm as a shortcoming of emergency managers and nonprofits.

The American Red Cross, which provides shelter after disasters, determined it should have had more emergency shelters, despite the risks of coronavirus transmission, in an informal review it conducted.

The report advised training additional employees who might coordinate services, as well as establishing “trigger” mechanisms to know when the disaster exceeds a certain level and needs have exceeded city abilities.

Resource requests

Frustration quickly mounted among residents as power remained out for days, and often weeks, after the storm.

A four-page improvement plan, prepared by the consultant, noted that “some perceptions from the ‘whole community’ included a lack of confidence that Cedar Rapids was responding appropriately to the situation.”

Process for Resource Requests by Gazette Online on Scribd

To address that, the firm recommended further educating the community about the resource request process and coordination that involves local service providers and county and state emergency management agencies.

People should understand what capabilities other partners can provide, as well as what the National Guard will and will not provide, according to the report. Additionally, it states that people should know how the process works — how decisions are made outside of the control of local incident command, which makes the official request and assigns resources.

That recommendation is likely intended to address the impact of KCRG-TV reports in the wake of the storm that Mayor Brad Hart said “we really don’t need” the National Guard. As power outages lingered, and some residents struggled to stay fed and those displaced scrambled to find shelter, some called for a prompt Guard deployment as has happened in past disasters.

But Hart has said he was referring to the resource request process and intended to communicate that resources other than the Guard, such as the Iowa Department of Transportation, could be better equipped to meet the city’s needs at the time. When around 100 Guard engineers came, they helped clear debris so power could be restored.

Training

Ultimately, the derecho highlighted a need to revise continuity plans and procedures to enhance coordination and ensure staff and elected officials know their roles and responsibilities in a disaster, the report states.

Fire Chief Greg Smith, the incident commander during the derecho, said the city implemented an Incident Management Team in 2012 after the 2008 flood to get staff across city departments working on a disaster in some capacity, which inherently means people are stepping outside of their traditional roles into more ad hoc positions to accomplish a given task.

"We had a lot of people step up and say, ‘I don't know how to do it, but I'll do my best,’ and so now I think some of that confusion, coming back with my interpretation of it, is that how do we institutionalize that and make sure that everybody's on the same page?” Smith said.

One recommendation included developing or assigning a city emergency management officer to serve as a liaison at the County Emergency Operations Centers during large-scale disaster response. Similarly, the county report advised creation of a Linn County Incident Management Team with members from each municipality who can respond to the center.

Continuing to train not only staff but elected officials was recommended in the report. Smith said council members receive two hours of training annually through a Federal Emergency Management Agency program for elected officials, but that “certainly is not enough to get somebody well-versed on roles and responsibilities with that,” such as understanding finance spending limits, signing disaster proclamations and setting the overarching policy direction, then leaving the response duties to public safety and other city personnel.

But there was success in many areas, the report stated.

“There were countless actions of dedicated emergency responders, city employees and citizens helping citizens, who worked selflessly during the incident to help their fellow Iowans,” it said.

Comments: (319) 398-8494; marissa.payne@thegazette.com