The brief, doomed rebellion of Gen. Stanley McChrystal

By Robert Givens

As William Westmoreland, the commander of the American forces in Vietnam, was departing Washington for his post in 1964, his commander in chief admonished, “Don't pull a MacArthur on me.”

Perhaps President Lyndon Johnson had a better understanding of political than military strategy. In any case, the president well knew how disruptive criticism of an uncertain military effort from the top field commander could be. Gen. Stanley McChrystal's dismissal is a recent example of this adage.

Comparing the present conflict in Afghanistan with previous wars that have frustrated the American public offers interesting contrasts. When faced with the onslaught of Chinese troops in November, 1950,

Douglas MacArthur proposed to deal with this conflict not by fighting the indecisive “police action” favored by the Truman administration, but in the form of a nuclear attack along the Chinese border.

His dismissal from command soon followed. Support for the Korean conflict plummeted.

Lyndon Johnson's warning may have been well taken; Westmoreland proved to be a faithful military servant. Like MacArthur, he sought a decisive end to a protracted conflict. Large units of American forces were dispatched to “search and destroy” the enemy, which allowed the North Vietnamese forces to determine when and where they would battle U.S. troops. Meanwhile, the president and a few advisers micromanaged the course of the air war.

Whitehouse strategy likely prolonged the hostilities. When the American public turned against the war, both the military and political commanders were humiliated and dismissed.

During the presidential campaign, Barack Obama made no secret of his desire to de-escalate the Iraq war and increase troop commitment in Afghanistan.

But fighting the Taliban was obviously not a conventional war. Distinguishing friend from foe required a knowledge of local culture and customs that few American troops possessed.

Although the Rolling Stone article that led to McChrystal's exit claims that counterinsurgency is “the new gospel of the Pentagon brass,” this doctrine really dates from the early Kennedy administration. Counterinsurgency does not seek to defeat the enemy in set battles, but to deprive it of the local population's support. Political offensives replace the more conventional military ones.

Presumably those afghanis who have not yet chosen sides will come to trust U.S. representatives and understand that they will benefit from governmental institutions that resemble those of the West.

Of course, it takes time to train soldiers in the mores of a country as different from the United States as Afghanistan, just as it takes time to win the trust of a people long suspicious of foreigners after successive invasions.

Counterinsurgency requires that areas of a country be secure from attacks. American representatives might be able to offer economic assistance, in the process reducing support for Taliban insurgents. Cultural initiatives, such as schools, are part of this approach. But in today's Afghanistan, there appear to be few sanctuaries.

Instead, the number of attacks on U.S. forces has spread. Counterinsurgency will take more time than the Obama administration is willing to commit.

McChrystal first clashed with the administration last year when he pressured the president to escalate the troop commitment. Like MacArthur, McChrystal warned of “mission failure,” and eventually obtained a significant portion of his request.

This success apparently did not heighten the general's view of the Obama administration. Allowing his subordinates to deride high-placed civilians with ultimate supervision for the war probably led the president to conclude that his field commander was at least unreliable, if not disloyal.

For an administration beleaguered by the Gulf oil spill and economic stagnation, this was simply too much to bear. It remains to be seen whether criticism of the Afghan conflict will add to the woes of Barack Obama.

Robert D. Givens is professor, Department of History, at Cornell College, Mount Vernon. Comments: RGivens@cornellcollege.edu