Beware a “Frozen Conflict” in Ukraine

While traveling along a major highway in the Caucasus country of Georgia with my family two years ago, I could see Joseph Stalin’s hometown of Gori on the right, while South Ossetia, a Russian-backed secessionist state, was on the left. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 when it thought the world would be distracted by the Beijing Olympics. South Ossetia and nearby Abkhazia, comprising some 20 percent of Georgia’s territory, are recognized as “independent” by Russia, Syria, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Russian troops guard the borders of these statelets. Georgia’s pro-Western aspirations have been stymied by these two “frozen conflicts,” much like the situation in Moldova where Russian troops prop up the pro-Moscow self-proclaimed statelet of Transnistria. While frozen conflicts don’t involve active combat, they undermine the economic and political development of the truncated mother country.

If Russia’s attempt to conquer Ukraine becomes a frozen conflict (i.e., militarily dormant but politically unresolved), Russia will have the opportunity to rebuild its bloodied army, reorganize its political and economic forces, and attempt to take Ukraine at a time of its choosing. After Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea and two statelets in eastern Ukraine, the fighting settled into a low-level stalemate until Putin invaded again last February, seizing 20 percent of Ukraine’s territory.

Courageous and surprisingly successful Ukrainian resistance pushed the Russian army back from Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson. The fighting has reached a stalemate, at least temporarily, but with Russia still occupying 17 percent of Ukraine. Western officials recently announced Russia has suffered between 180,000 and 200,000 killed, wounded, or missing. Unofficial Russian sources claim 50,000 convicts have been released from Russian prisons to join the Wagner mercenary group; Wagner mercenaries have reportedly suffered an 80 percent casualty rate as cannon fodder in the battle of Bakhmut.

In September Putin ordered the mobilization of 300,000 troops; the raw recruits have died in large numbers but have stabilized the front lines. Russia is thought to be preparing a massive Spring offensive and another huge mobilization. Its armament factories are working three shifts. With a population of 142 million, Russia outnumbers Ukraine by more than three to one and its economy is eleven times larger. Ukraine’s small economy shrank by 30 percent in 2022, while Russia’s contracted only 2.5 percent. Putin’s war coffers remain full despite partial Western sanctions, thanks in part to petroleum exports to China and India.

Ukrainian officials hope Western tanks and other advanced weapons now flowing to Ukraine will enable it to throw a decisive punch by late spring or summer. If Russia’s horrific casualty rates continue in the face of ongoing Ukrainian and Western resolve, we may see Putin or his minions elsewhere call for a “humanitarian” cease-fire in place. If Ukraine is pressured by its partners into accepting a cessation of hostilities prior to Russia’s withdraw to its internationally recognized borders, the war would become a frozen conflict. This would give Russia time to regroup, rearm, and reinforce – it would only be a matter of time until the attempt at conquest, begun in 2014, is resumed by Moscow.

As a former career diplomat who values negotiation as a way to resolve conflict, it pains me somewhat to oppose efforts by outside parties to lever Ukraine into negotiations. We can’t forget that Russia occupies a sixth of Ukraine and fires missiles at civilians far from the front lines. A cease-fire in place and a frozen conflict work in Russia’s favor, to the detriment of Ukraine and its Western partners. If Putin really wants the war to end, all he has to do is order a withdrawal.

Ron McMullen is a former career diplomat who teaches political science at the University of Iowa.