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No vote for Iowa’s felons
Staff Editorial
Dec. 7, 2014 12:20 am
When Iowa became a state in the mid-1800s, the adopted Constitution naturally reflected the views of the time. Specific rights were bestowed upon free, white men, including the privilege of casting a ballot.
Over the years, and while the basic framework of the Iowa Constitution has endured, the Legislature, courts and state residents have consistently and purposefully excised voting limitations now considered discriminatory. One piece remains, however, and requires attention.
Only two classes of adults are permanently barred from voting in Iowa: those deemed mentally incompetent and people convicted 'of any infamous crime.”
The issue created by this section is two-pronged: First, there is no clear definition of 'infamous.” Second, evidence shows such 'one strike and you're out” policies are not in society's best interests.
Poor choices have consequences, and it is wholly reasonable to punish criminal behavior in a manner appropriate to the deed. But justice is not served and society does not benefit from denying basic respect and dignity to those who have paid for their infractions.
Today, all Iowans convicted of any felony are stripped of their voting rights, which only can be reinstated by a governor's pardon.
We think that is too broad an application of the constitutional provision. It is our hope an upcoming court case will bring clarity to the constitution's use of 'infamous crimes” by narrowly defining the term and removing all non-violent offenses.
We also question whether the governor's office, which has long employed partisan posturing in setting policy, is best suited to decide who is allowed to rejoin the electorate and the process required for them to do so.
Finally, and as we'll further address below, the current on-again, off-again executive actions regarding restoration of voting rights have not served the people of Iowa. Confusion, misunderstanding and ill-will have permeated what should be a thoughtful and transparent process.
LESSONS FROM FLORIDA
Before 2005, those who were convicted of any felony or aggravated misdemeanor needed to apply to the governor's office for reinstatement. When then-Gov. Tom Vilsack took office, he ordered those voting rights would automatically be restored once the convicted person completed his or her sentence. For about seven years thereafter, no applications were required.
But in January 2011, Gov. Terry Branstad, on his first day back in office, issued his own executive order re-establishing the application process and, in fact, making it more onerous than it had previously been.
Applicants not only had to provide detailed information regarding their previous conviction (i.e., current addresses for the prosecutor and judge that handed down the sentence) and purchase a copy of their own criminal record from the Iowa Department of Corrections, but also had to submit to a credit report.
Following objections that the practice amounted to a poll tax, Branstad nixed the credit reporting in December 2012, but otherwise left the new process intact.
Dueling executive orders have created confusion about who must apply to have their voting rights restored.
Twenty-three of the 110 applications received by the governor's office under Branstad's most recent term were from people who already had their rights restored. Others who were sentenced during the Vilsack and Chet Culver administrations were told their rights would be automatically restored - a correct statement at the time - to find that when their sentence ended during the Branstad administration, the rules had changed.
While the situation seems a bit absurd, it isn't completely unique.
In 2007, Charlie Crist, serving as Florida's governor, issued an executive order that automatically restored voting rights to all non-violent felons in the state. During the three years remaining in his term, more than 150,000 Floridians regained their right to cast a ballot.
When Gov. Rick Scott was elected four years later, he rescinded the order and imposed rules even more strict than had previously been in place.
Florida law now requires would-be voters to wait five years after their release from state custody and completion of all state requirements, including payment of all fines and restitution, before making application.
Once submitted, the application could sit for seven years before it is reviewed by the state's clemency board. In the interim, legal infractions by the applicant, even false arrest, restart the clock.
During Florida's executive order duel, the state's Parole Commission took a look at the 150,000 Floridians who had regained voting rights.
Their report found the rate of recidivism for the group was one-third below the general rate. In other words, those released from prison and automatically given back their voting rights were less likely to reoffend.
The Florida study is more intriguing than inclusive. It does not attempt to identify cause and effect. Still, numerous studies have linked broader civic participation to lower rates of recidivism. Fully integrating ex-offenders into society is the best way to encourage lasting rehabilitation.
Those most concerned about regaining voting rights are people most interested in rejoining communities, and we should be doing all we can to encourage their participation, not alienate them.
FORCING THE CONVERSATION
A true case in point is Kelli Jo Griffin, a 41-year-old woman from Montrose. Previously convicted in 2008 of a low-level drug offense, Griffin successfully completed probation. When sentenced, she was told her voting rights would be restored at the end of her five-year punishment.
Ten months after her sentence was discharged, she registered and cast a ballot in a 2013 uncontested city election. She wanted, she said, to let her children see the process firsthand.
When law enforcement came knocking, she learned Branstad's executive order had prevented the automatic restoration of rights she'd been told to expect. Prosecutors charged her with voter fraud and as an habitual offender, which meant she faced a minimum three-year prison sentence.
The trial ended last March, with Griffin's acquittal. The jury foreman said the woman had obviously made an honest mistake. Nonetheless, Griffin and her family have paid a price - including $10,000 in legal fees and the damage to Griffin's reputation, which she'd worked to rebuild.
Last month, ACLU of Iowa filed a lawsuit in Polk County District Court on Griffin's behalf. Naming Branstad, Secretary of State Matt Schultz and Lee County Auditor Denise Fraise, the suit argues Griffin should never have had her voting rights removed, that her particular offense does not rise to 'infamous” standards.
In a landmark case earlier this year - Chiodo v. Section/Bisignano - the Iowa Supreme Court said aggravated misdemeanors aren't 'infamous” crimes that should result in disenfranchisement. The ruling hinted there may also be legal wiggle room within Iowa's felony structure, but did not expand on which felonies are and are not 'infamous.”
'Our founders not only declined to list specific crimes that would disqualify people from participating in the election process, they did not use traditional classes or categories of crimes such as felony or misdemeanor to disqualify a voter,” wrote Chief Justice Mark Cady. 'Instead, our founders gave us the phrase ‘infamous crime.' The foundational question we face today is whether the crime ...
is an infamous crime.”
In all previous cases, the Iowa Supreme Court had provided very straightforward guidance on whether or not a crime could be considered infamous: if the crime carried a possible penalty of imprisonment within a penitentiary, the crime was infamous. However, the Chiodo case forced the Justices for the first time to further analyze the term within the context of voting rights.
'As with our reasoning dispensing with the infamous-punishment test, if our founders intended the infamous crimes clause to mean all felony crimes, we must presume they would have used the word ‘felony' instead of the phrase ‘infamous crime.' Accordingly, the legislature's decision to define an ‘infamous crime' as a ‘felony' cannot stand alone to define the constitutional meaning of ‘infamous crime' because the two terms unquestionably have different meanings,” he added.
The court noted that an early version of the Iowa Constitution gave specific permission to the legislature to define which crimes would be infamous, but the language was subsequently removed from all later copies. Following much further discussion regarding the founders intent, however, the Justices punted by choosing only to exclude the misdemeanor case before them.
'Considering the crime at the center of this case, we need not conclusively articulate a precise definition of ‘infamous crime' at this time. We only conclude that the crime must be classified as particularly serious, and it must be a crime that reveals that voters who commit the crime would tend to undermine the process of democratic governance through elections.”
And, because the final decision of the court was split - three joining a majority opinion, two concurring with the case decision but expressing a separate overall sentiment and one dissenting - the legal waters on this topic are the consistency of mud pies.
The ACLU lawsuit is aiming to further force the conversation, asking the court to look again at the criminal code to determine which crimes are 'infamous.” The roughly 14,500 who have completed criminal sentences since January 2011 - minus the 64 who have had their voting rights reinstated by Gov. Branstad - will be affected if the court chooses to answer.
' Comments: editorial@thegazette.com or (319) 398-8262.
BY THE NUMBERS -
Between Jan. 14, 2011, and Dec. 1, 2014, roughly 14,500 people have discharged a felony offense in Iowa and have not been convicted of another felony, making each eligible to apply for restoration of voting rights. During the same time period, Gov. Terry Branstad's office has received 110 applications.
' 64: Have had their rights restored
' 23: Already had the right to vote
' 18: Have been contacted with/for additional information
' 4: Had not fully discharged their sentence
' 1: Is being processed by state
Source: Iowa Governor's Office
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